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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought this action under the State's 
power of eminent domain in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County, to acquire from defendants part of their property 
for the widening of West 3500 South. Plaintiff appeals 
from the Judgment on the Verdict rendered by the jury in 
the lower court and bases its appeal on alleged errors in 
the rulings of the Judge throughout the course of the trial. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This matter was tried before a jury on June 29, 1975, 
Judge Gordon Hall, presiding. The verdict was returned in 
favor of the defendants in the amount of $50,983. 
^•••••••i 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment on the 
verdict entered by the court below and remand of this matter 
for a new trial before a different jury. Also sought is a 
determination by the Supreme Court of Utah that the value of 
property sought to be acquired by eminent domain is determined 
by its value on the date on which there is service of summons. 
That all damages are to be affixed as of this date and that 
it was prejudicial for the court to allow the defendants1 
witnesses to testify to a taking of the property some four 
years before the service of summons. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Plaintiff, Road Commission, condemned a portion of 
property owned by the defendants on the south-west corner of 
3500 South and 14th West in Salt Lake County. The purpose 
for this taking was for the v/idening of 3500 South. The prop-
erty in the before condition had dimensions of 227-feet along 
3500 South and an average depth of 160-feet. The defendants, 
Uintah Oil had a lease on an area of 175-feet along 3500 South 
and a depth of 173-feet. The lease was entered into on Septem-
ber 1, 1962, and was to run for ten years with an option to re-
new for another ten years. Shortly after the lease was entered 
into, the defendant, Uintah Oil, constructed a service station 
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improvement on the area leased for the purpose of operating a 
service station. At the end of the lease whatever improvements 
were remaining on the area leased, would belong to the lessors, 
defendants, Helm and Dambrosi. The contract rent was $150 per 
month with one-cent a gallon per month override on the gallon-
age sold between 15,000 and 25,000. 
The lessees renewed their lease on December 8, 1972. 
It was undisputed the station ceased operating as a service 
station in July of 1970. From and after this time, the defend-
ant lessee continued paying rent of $150 per month until the 
condemnation was filed. 
The widening of 3500 South required a taking of 60-
feet along the front or north side of the property. 
Just prior to trial, in the chambers of Judge Hall, 
counsel for appellant sought a ruling that the property would 
have to be valued with respect to the condition of the improve-
ments as of the date of the service of summons. It was agreed 
that the taking for the widening of 3500 South would destroy 
any improvements located on the property. It would be the 
contention of appellant that although the court did not make 
a formal ruling, there was a consensus that the property and 
improvements would be valued on the date of the service of 
summons. 
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Later, during the course of the trial, the defendants 
felt it was important to have before the jury the reasons why 
the service station was not in operation as of the agreed upon 
date of valuation. (Tr. 17, 29, 33, 34, 41, 42). 
The appellant objected, but the court allowed the re-
spondents to testify. Also during the presentation of respond-
ents1 case, the court allowed slides to be shown to the jury 
which showed the demolition of the improvements by the Statefs 
construction, even though the appellant objected. (Exhibits 
3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 3.10, 3.11) (Tr. 136). 
During the presentation of appellants1 case, the court 
refused to admit into evidence an Exhibit (13-P) which showed 
the gallonage of the station on a monthly basis from its open-
ing until its closure in July of 1970. (Tr. 229). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE DEFENDANT-
RESPONDENTS TO TESTIFY REGARDING THE REASONS WHY THE STATION 
WAS CLOSED IN JULY OF 19 70. 
The parties were in agreement that the date of valua-
tion was on the date of the service of summons which was on or 
about April 30, 1974. Over the objection of the plaintiff-ap-
pellant the respondent-defendants were allowed to introduce 
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testimony as to when the station was closed and the supposed 
reasons requiring the closure of the station. (Tr. 17, 29, 33, 
34, 41, 42, 73, 133, 134) . 
In each of the instances referred to above, the responc 
ent-defendants were allowed to testify without proper founda-
tion as to what conversations were had between themselves and 
certain unnamed employees of the Road Commission and what they 
learned concerning the imminence of the condemnation. 
Section 78-34-11 Utah Code Ann. states as follows: 
"When right to damages deemed to 
have accrued. For the purpose of as-
sessing compensation and damages, the 
right thereto shall be deemed to have 
accrued at the date of the service of 
summons, and its actual value at that 
date shall be the measure of compensa-
tion for all property to be actually 
taken, . . . " 
Appellant's position is as follows: The court allowed 
the testimony of the defendants concerning the closure of the 
station some four years before the date of valuation which was 
prejudicial and tended to create sympathy and support for the 
testimony of the defendants. It was inherent in the fact that 
defendants testified that the station could not continue in 
operation without extensive improvements, and from what they 
learned, the condemnation was so imminent it was totally un-
economical to make the needed repairs and improvements. Also, 
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despite the fa<- .lie station was closed, the defendants, 
Uintah Oil, testified they were not only obligated to pay 
the monthly rental, but were required to renew their lease 
in December <•" .'»v?, so as to protect their original invest-
ment. (Tr. 73) 
Also, (TI, 12) the defendants indicate the exact, 
time of the closure of the station was important to determine 
severance damages. 
This coui b specifically ru1ed on this question i n the 
case of State v. Bettilyon, 17 UtalI 2d 135, 405 P. 2d -liO i i \^ , 
The court held the measure of compensation lor Ian-
 lu^ .-.i..;iy 
taken is the market value of the land on the date the summons 
is served or land actually taken. In the Bettilyon case, tlle 
Couiity Planning Commission deferred the applicatj..;:r, of Bettilyo 
to have their property subdivided. The request for deferrment 
came from the State Road because of their expected use of the 
property for tl le constri icti on of a highway. This deferrment 
did not constitute a taking so as to entitle the landowners to 
expenses incurred thereafter. 
Also, § 57- 12-13 Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended, 
reads as follows: 
11
 . . . Any decrease or in-
crease of the fair market value 
of real property prior to the date 
of valuation caused by the public 
improvement for which such property 
is acquired or by the likelihood 
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that the property would be ac-
quired for such improvement, other 
than that due to physical deteriora-
tion within the reasonable control 
of the owner, will be disregarded 
in determining the compensation for 
the property. . . ." 
The court sjiould not have allowed any testimony from 
witnesses that showed any decrease of the fair market value 
of the improvement that may have been caused by the announce-
ment of the widening of 3500 South State Street. 
The witnesses for Uintah Oil (Tr. 70) were allowed to 
testify that because of the impending condemnation, the station 
could not continue in operation without the needed improvements 
and in fact they could not get an operator. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE DEFENDANTS 
TO SHOW PICTURES OF THE DEMOLITION OF THE IMPROVEMENTS LOCATED 
ON THE PROPERTY. 
As set forth in Point I, the date of valuation was 
April of 1974. Over the objection of appellant, the defendant-
respondents, Helm and Dambrosi, (Tr. 136, 137) were allowed to 
introduce into evidence Exhibits 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11 
which depict and show the demolition of the building by the 
contractor for the State. The claim of the respondents was 
the destruction of the building as depicted by the foregoing 
Exhibits showed there was not any salvage in the buildings. 
-7-
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The defendants1 appraiser could have testified there was no 
salvage in the building and then be subject to cross examina-
tion on this particular item. Instead, the pictures were 
introduced solely for the purpose of inflaming and prejudic-
ing the jury. It was totally irrelevant to the lawsuit whether 
there was any salvage in the remaining building. The test.is 
what a purchaser would have paid for the land and improvements 
on the date of valuation. Salvage, if any, should not have 
been considered in this lawsuit. § 78-34-10 (1953) as amended 
sets forth how compensation and damages should be offered: 
!lThe court, jury or referee 
must hear such legal evidence as 
may be offered by any of the par-
ties to the proceedings, and there-
upon must ascertain and assess: 
(1) The value of the property 
sought to be condemned and all im-
provements thereon appertaining to 
the realty, and of each and every 
separate estate or interest therein; 
and if it consists of different par-
cels, the value of each parcel and of 
each estate or interest therein shall 
be separately assessed. . . . " 
The testimony of the defendants throughout the entire course of 
this trial was that this building was a valuable improvement and 
accordingly, had considerable value. The plaintiff purchased 
those buildings and, therefore, was obligated to pay fair market 
value, and what was eventually done to those buildings was en-
tirely irrelevant to this lawsuit. 
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POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT ADMITTING INTO 
EVIDENCE THE STATEMENT OF THE GALLONAGE OF THE STATION FROM 
THE TIME IT OPENED UNTIL IT CLOSED IN JULY OF 1970. 
The court sustained the objection of the defendant-
respondents, (Tr. 319) in the closing argument of the appel-
lants that related to the gallonage the station purportedly 
pumped prior to its closure. 
The court based its ruling on what was discussed and 
decided at a supposed pre-trial conference which does not ap-
pear in the record. Appellant would contend that it was proper 
argument to call the attention of the jury to the failure of 
the defendants to introduce the record of the gallonage the 
station pumped prior to its closure. Counsel for appellant 
would remember that during the off-the-record discussion, the 
court ruled that Exhibit 13-P was acquired by the plaintiff 
as a result of the negotiations of the parties and was prior 
to any action being filed. (Tr. 125, 126) The ruling of the 
court, although in error, was presumably predicated on the 
fact, this Exhibit 13-P should have been discovered. This rul-
ing should not have precluded counsel for the appellant from 
referring to the fact that no gallonage figures were introduced 
by the defendants to substantiate the amount of gallonage the 
station supposedly pumped. The witness for the defendants, Mr. 
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Wilbur Harding, testified that he remembered the gallonage for 
one month being 65,000, but could not remember the gallonages 
for the other months (Tr. 174). Mr. Ashton was allowed to 
testify (Tr. 123) that prior to its closure, the station pumped 
60 to 65,000 gallons per month. The court should have allowed 
counsel for appellant to refer to the fact that respondent- did 
not introduce the gallonages of the station prior to its clo-
sure. Also, the court should have allowed the introduction of 
the record of the gallonage (Exhibit 13-P) because some high 
gallonage was testified to but the actual exhibit was not al-
lowed into evidence. Appellant would concede that Exhibit 
13-P was supplied by the attorney for the respondent prior to 
the initiation of the action, but was supplied in an effort 
to resolve the matter short of trial. Also, any objection 
the respondents may have had was overcome by the fact their 
own witnesses testified to the gallonages for some of the montlis 
in question. Also, there was no objection that the gallonage 
figures were not correct, or that the document had in anyway 
been altered. 
The law is generally recognized that where a party 
fails to produce available evidence, a presumption of inference 
arises that such evidence or testimony would have been unfavor-
able to him and counsel may comment accordingly. 88 C.J.S. 
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(Trial) § 184 (1955) 29 Am. Jur. 2d (evidence) § 175 (1967) 
31 A. C.J.S. (evidence) § 156 (1) (1964) . 
CONCLUSION 
Many factors are involved directly and indirectly in 
the valuation of a tract of property. Certain of these facts 
are definitely admissible and are relevent in an eminent domain 
proceeding. All of the objections as raised in this appeal 
deal with the specific question as to what the jury can con-
sider as compensable items as evidence in such a condemnation 
proceeding. The statutes of the State of Utah are specific 
as to the time v/hen valuation whould occur; what transpires 
before or after this date is totally immaterial. The fact 
the station was closed some four years before the date of valu-
ation and that the buildings were totally destroyed by the 
appellant after the critical date is of no importance and 
should not have been allowed before the jury. 
Furthermore/ the trial judge refused to allow counsel 
for appellant to refer to the respondents failure to introduce 
general figures of gallonage and not just certain high per 
month gallonages which constituted an error. 
Appellant respectfully requests that the Judgment 
on the Verdict be reversed and the case be remanded for a 
trial before a new jury with directions that the previous closure 
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of the station, as well as the possible salvage of the build-
ings be declared inadmissible. Also, that Exhibit 13-P be 
declared admissible and that counsel for appellant be allowed 
to comment that the gallonage figures were not presented to 
this jury by the respondents. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
c-Att;orney General 
y^^/a^^ 
STEPHEN C. WARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
115 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellar 
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